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IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
PERCY MOUNTEER,
Appellant and
Petitioner,
v.

Supreme Court Case No,

UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,
Respondent.

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Is slander (committed by one employee acting within the
scope of her employment, against a co-employee) a compensable
industrial accident, for which civil relief is barred under the
exclusivity provisions of the Utah Worker's Compensation Act,
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-60 (1988)?

REFERENCE TO REPORTS OF OPINIONS ISSUED BY
COURT OF APPEALS
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari from an
opinion issued by the Court of Appeals of the State of Utah as
Case No. 880189-CA and reported as Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light
Co., 107 Utah Adv. Rpt. 71 (Court of Appeals 5/2/89).
STATEMENT OF GROUNDS OF JURISDICTION
The decision of the Court of Appeals was filed May 2,
1989, and this Petition is, therefore, timely under Rule 45 of
the Rules of the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court of the State

of Utah has jurisdiction over this matter by virtue of Utah Code
Ann. §78-2-3(i) and §78-2(a)-3 (1987) as an appeal in a civil
matter from a final ruling or judgment in a district court in
which the Court of Appeals does not have original jurisdiction.
(All Utah Code references are to Utah Code Ann. 1953.) The
appeal was originally filed before the Supreme Court as Supreme
Court Case No. 87-0374 on January 19, 1988. Thereafter, this
appeal was assigned to the Court of Appeals.
This Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme
Court of Utah is sought pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 43(4) as
an issue of state law not previously decided by the Supreme
Court; Rule 43(2), as a decision by a panel of the Court of
Appeals which is in conflict with the Supreme Court on a matter
of state law; and Rule 43(3), as a decision that has
substantially departed from existing case authority on the
important issue of what constitutes an "accident" in the field of
worker's compensation law.

CONTROLLING PROVISIONS
The only provision of Utah law which may be controlling
is Utah Code Ann. 1953, §35-1-60 (1988), dealing with the
exclusivity of the worker's compensation remedy.

This section is

cited in the argument below and attached as Appendix E.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The plaintiff below, Percy Mounteer ("Mounteer") sued
Utah Power & Light for damages resulting from a slander and

intentional infliction of emotional distress committed by another
Utah Power & Light employee, acting within the scope of her
actual authority.

The trial court dismissed the Complaint under

Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.

The Complaint is attached hereto as Appendix A

and the court's Minute Entry and Order of Dismissal are attached
as Appendices B and C, respectively.
The case was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court
(Supreme Court No. 87-0374) and subsequently transferred to the
Utah Court of Appeals, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-3(i) and
§78-2(a)-3 (1987).

In a Memorandum Decision filed as Mounteer v.

Utah Power & Light Co., 107 U.A.R. 71 (Ct. App. May 2, 1989), the
Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal.

This petition for

certiorari was thereafter timely filed.
In reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim,
this court construes the Complaint in a light most favorable to
the plaintiff and indulges all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiff's favor.

Arrow Indus, v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 767

P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988).

Since this was done by the Court of

Appeals and many issues were decided favorable to the Appellant,
only those facts necessary to understand the background of
the case are discussed.
Mounteer was an employee of Utah Power & Light Company
who was on duty the night of the Wilberg Mine disaster, and
developed an emotional and nervous condition as a result thereof.
(Record, page 3; hereinafter "R.

n

) . He was the employee

who shut down the power to the mine because of a misunderstanding
3

(R.2).

Niki Larsen ("Larsen") was a security guard assigned to

investigate Mounteer for suspected drug use. R. 2, 4.

In the

course of her investigation, Larsen interviewed Mounteer and then
called the mine superintendent over a loud speaker, accusing
Mounteer of being on drugs. Many other employees heard the
allegations, which were false.

R. 2, 4.

Mounteerfs Complaint against Utah Power & Light alleged
slander and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional
distress.

Mounteer claimed that Utah Power & Light was

vicariously liable for Larsen's actions because she acted within
the scope of her actual or apparent authority.

Appendix A. Most

of the argument below in both the trial court and before the
Court of Appeals dealt with the issue as to whether or not Larsen
was operating within the scope of her authority.

The court's

Minute Entry did not even mention the worker's compensation
exclusivity provision ("worker's compensation bar") as a reason
for its decision.

Appendix B.

The Order and Judgment of

Dismissal again focused totally on the issues of vicarious
liability for defamatory statements and did not mention the
worker's compensation bar. Mounteer's Brief on appeal made only
passing mention of the issue (2 pages in a 20 page Brief), noting
that he was only raising the issue because it had been raised by
Utah Power & Light in its Motion to Dismiss below, although it
was not a part of the court's decision and did not seem to be a
basis of the appeal. Mounteer Brief, p. 17-18.

Utah Power &

Light's Brief on appeal did not even mention the worker's

compensation issue.

The issue was only mentioned in passing

during oral argument before the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals agreed with Mounteer that Larsen
was acting within the scope of her employment, implying that Utah
Power & Light would, therefore, normally be liable for her
defamatory statements.

Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co, supra

at 72. However, the Court of Appeals surprisingly focused on the
worker's compensation issue, finding that Mounteer's action was
barred by the exclusivity provisions of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-60
(1988).

The Court of Appeals thus sustained the dismissal on the

sole ground that the slander against Mounteer constituted a
compensable "accident" under the Utah Worker's Compensation Act,
which barred a civil suit.

Mounteer, supra at 73.

| ARGUMENT |
SLANDER (AND INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS) SHOULD NOT BE DEEMED TO BE A COMPENSABLE
"INJURY" WHICH "OCCURS BY ACCIDENT," UNDER WORKER'S
COMPENSATION, THUS BARRING MAINTENANCE OF A CIVIL
ACTION. SUCH A HOLDING IS INCONSISTENT WITH
ESTABLISHED LAW AND IS BAD PUBLIC POLICY.
The Court of Appeals essentially held that a slander
committed by one employee against another, while in the scope of
employment, is an "injury" resulting from an "accident" under the
Worker's Compensation Act, thus barring a civil suit under
§35-1-60.

Mounteer, supra at 72-3. Mounteer maintains that

holding is in conflit with the Supreme Court's decision in Allen
v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986); contrary to

established precedent; and bad law and bad policy for the State
of Utah.

A.

Slander Is Not an "Accident" or an "Injury."

Utah Code Ann. §35-1-60 (1988) provides in pertinent
part as follows:
The right to recover compensation pursuant to
the provisions of this title for injuries
sustained by an employee, . . . shall be the
exclusive remedy against the employer . . .
and the liabilities of the employer imposed by
this act shall be in place of any and all other
civil liability whatsoever, at common law
or otherwise, to such employee . . . on account
of any accident or injury . . . incurred by
such employee in the course of or because of
or arising out of his employment, and no
action at law may be maintained against an
employer . . . based upon any accidenty injury
or death of an employee, (emphasis added)
This statute is attached in its entirety as Appendix E.

Utah

Code Ann. §35-1-45 (1987) defines a compensable "injury" as one
that "occurs by accident" arising out of or in the course of
employment.

Thus, for the worker's compensation bar to come into

play, the employee must have an "accident" which results in an
"injury."

This Court has defined "accident" for purposes of

worker's compensation as ". . .an unexpected or unintended
occurrence that may be either the cause or the result of the
injury."

Allen, supra at 22.
The Court of Appeals correctly characterizes Mounteer's

claim for damages from the slander and intentional infliction of
emotional distress as follows:

He requested reimbursement for medical
expenses, and damages for permanent total
disability, suffering, and damage to
reputation. (emphasis added)
Mounteer, supra at 72. The Court of Appeals1 opinion then tries
to force the slander allegations into the mold of an "accident,"
while totally ignoring the actual allegations in the Complaint.
The opinion notes:
According to Mounteer's own allegations,
he was indisputably injured by accident
arising out of or in the course of his
employment. He was thus clearly barred
by the statute from bringing a negligence
action at law against either Larsen or
Utah Power & Light. (emphasis added)
Id. at 73.

That characterization is erroneous.

Mounteer1s Brief

on Appeal strongly asserts that his injuries were not the result
of an accident (see Point III of Appellant's Brief).

Moreover,

the Allen definition of accident requires an "unexpected or
unintended occurrence" that causes the injury.

Larsen's acts of

slander, as alleged in the Complaint, can hardly be termed
"unexpected" or "unintended."

The trial court and the Court of

Appeals were obligated to take the allegations of the Complaint
at face value.

Those allegations indicated that Larsen's actions

were done "knowingly" (Paragraph 7) and that the actions were
"intentional or at least grossly negligent" (Paragraph 17, R. 4).
The Court of Appeals1 holding that the slander against
Mounteer constituted an "accident" or "injury" is contorted and
highly questionable, based upon the statutory definitions in the
Allen case.

It makes more sense to deem slander not to be an

"accident," but to view it as "intentional" or "grossly

negligent" conduct, which should fall outside the worker's
compensation bar in §35-1-60.

B.

Contrary to Established Case Law.

The Court of Appeals1 decision is contrary to most of
the established, well-reasoned case law dealing with slander and
other similar torts in an employment setting.

The major case in

the field is Braman v. Walthall, 225 S.W.2d 342 (Ark. 1949).
That case held that the essence of the tort of defamation is
damage to one's reputation, not injury to one's physical or
psychological being as contemplated by the Worker's Compensation
Act.

Any physiological injury and physical effects as a result

of the defamation are secondary to the damage to reputation;
therefore, a defamation action is not barred by the exclusivity
provision of the Act.
§§68.33 and 68.31.

Larson, Workman's Compensation Desk Ed.,

Professor Larson commented on the issue of

slander as follows:
Here, as in the case of false imprisonment,
the only element that introduces any
possibility of serious controversy is the
inclusion of physical injury as an element of
damages. The same comment seems called for:
the real gist of slander is not personal
injury. To block the main thrust of the
action because of this peripheral item, when
a compensation claim could not purport to
give relief for the main wrong, would be
incongruous, and since splitting the cause of
action is frowned on by courts and certainly
outside the obvious intent of the
exclusiveness clause would not be justified
merely to put the personal injury item into
the compensation stream, the cause of action
belongs where its real essence lies, in the
field of tort. (emphasis added)
Q

Id. at §68.33, pp. 13-26.

Although Mounteer sustained

significant personal injuries from the slander, the initial
detriment was significant damage to his reputation and character.
Several hundred people heard Niki Larsen falsely claim to the
mine supervisor, over an open public-address system, that
Mounteer was on drugs.

Price, Utah, is a small town.

Obviously,

the reaction of the townspeople would be immediate and severe
upon learning that the person who shut off the power in the
Wilberg mine disaster (R. 2) was "on drugs."

The real gist of

slander generally is not personal injury, although it is
certainly an issue in this case.

This Court could order that the

cause of action be split, and that the case go to trial against
Utah Power & Light on the issue of damage to reputation without
any consideration of the physical damages sustained by Mounteer
(which would be reserved for worker's compensation).

That, of

course, would violate a long-standing policy of all courts
against splitting a cause of action.
Mounteer has no remedy under worker's compensation for
damage to his reputation, although such was alleged in the
Complaint.

Appendix A, Page 6, Paragraph 2.

If one looks at

just the "damage to reputation" component of the slander
Complaint, there is certainly no "accident" or "injury," and,
therefore, the Industrial Commission would not countenance
damages for that loss under the auspices of a standard worker's
compensation claim.

Therefore, if this Court were to uphold the

Court of Appeals' decision in whole, it would have the effect of

simply denying Percy Mounteer any compensation for the damage to
his reputation, an item which is clearly non-compensable under
the Worker's Compensation Act.

Since there is no quid pro quo

for such a denial, it would violate Mounteer's Fifth Amendment
rights to due process of law.

Wright v. Central Dupage Assn.,

367 N.E.2d 736 (111. 1976); Moushon v. National Garages, 137
N.E.2d 842 at 845 (111. 1956).
Other cases have held that civil actions for similar
torts such as false imprisonment and intentional infliction of
emotional distress are not barred by the Worker's Compensation
Acts.

See, Smith v. Rich's, Inc., 123 S.E.2d 316 (Ga. App. 1961)

(false imprisonment); Skelton v. W. T. Grant Co., 331 F.2d 593
(5th Cir. 1964) (false imprisonment); Cohen v. Lion Products Co.,
177 F.Supp. 486 (D. Mass. 1959) (dictum; intentional infliction
of emotional distress); Boscaglia v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 362
N.W.2d 642 (Mich. 1955) (action for nervous breakdown as a result
of job discrimination not barred by compensation exclusiveness).
There are cases to the contrary in this field.

Also, some cases

have allowed the splitting of a cause of action. Stimson v.
Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 258 N.W.2d 227 (Mich 1977).
This Court may want to adopt an intermediate position
and reverse only in part.

Mounteer could be allowed to go back

to the trial court and maintain his cause of action for damage to
his reputation (and perhaps other non-phsycial damages for pain
and suffering as well).

Under such a proposal, the physical and

psychological aspects of the claim could be handled under
worker's compensation.

C.

Bad Public Policy,

Upholding this Court of Appeals decision would be bad
public policy because it would bring the tort of slander into the
industrial compensation system, when that system is not capable
of dealing with the issues of slander in the work place could
lead to illogical and incongruous results in future cases. For
example, suppose that Mounteer in this case did not suffer any
psychological or physical injury as a result of the slander.
Under the Court of Appeals ruling, Mounteer would presumably have
a cause of action against Utah Power & Light for damage to his
character and reputation.

Thus, two persons with an identical

slander in the same work place may be treated differently simply
because one person's reaction to the slander causes secondary
psychological or physical effects.

The person with the

psychological injury will be barred from filing suit in district
court and be forced into the workerfs compensation regime where
he will be forced to prove that the slander was an "accident."
The first employee will also forfeit (without due process of law)
any cause of action he has for the damage-to-reputation component
of his claim.

The other employee, perhaps employed by the same

business, would be free to sue in court because his only damage
is to his reputation.

Such an incongruous result is not good

public policy.
Furthermore, does this state want to encourage
incidents of slander in the work place to be filed as workerfs

compensation claims?

There must be numerous instances in the

work-a-day world where statements are made by fellow employees or
supervisors that are "slanderous." Yet, virtually no such cases
make their way into the worker's compensation system, as viewed
by the paucity of cases cited in Larson (see, Worker's
Compensation, supra at §68.33).
The Court of Appeals1 holding will encourage the filing
of such actions as worker's compensation claims because of the
"no-fault" basis of the act.

Under the Court of Appeals'

holding, presumably the employee would merely have to allege that
a statement was made in the work place and that he suffered
psychological harm from it.

The employee would not have to prove

the elements of slander, as he would in a court of law, anymore
than he would have to prove the elements of negligence if he were
injured by a falling ladder or a grease spot left on the floor.
In short, the Court of Appeals decision significantly expands the
worker's compensation liability of employers generally, not only
to questionable slander claims but also to claims for false
imprisonment, discrimination, wrongful discharge and a host of
other tort actions that might result in secondary psychological
damage.

This is highly questionable as a matter of state policy.
Under the Court of Appeals' ruling, in conjunction with

the definition of accident under Allen, an employee could even
establish a worker's compensation claim if he were slandered on
the job by a third party!

Suppose that the employee was a clerk

at a fast-food store and while on duty, an acquaintance comes in
and makes false, severely defamatory remarks about her chastity
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in front of other employees and customers•

The employee suffers

a reaction, becomes physically ill and sustains permanent
incapacity as a result.

Under the Court of Appeals ruling, the

incident constitutes an "industrial accident."
The incongruous, illogical holding of the Court of
Appeals is further emphasized when we consider the nature of the
slander in the Mounteer case.

Although Mounteer was at work at

the time, he was engaged in no work activity which engendered the
slander itself.

The slander could just have easily occurred

outside of the time, place and location of his employment.
Mounteer could have been confronted at a restaurant with the
same allegations, which could have been overheard by various
members of the community and passed on to others.

There was

nothing inherently work-related with respect to the content of
the slanderous remarks.

Therefore, there is nothing peculiar or

special about what Mounteer was doing for the employer at the
time that would or should make his case a compensable accident
under workerfs compensation law.
Cases such as Percy Mounteerfs are best left to the
civil courts for several reasons. First, the courts are better
able to deal with issues such as slander, which generally
embraces a strong non-physical component of damage.

The courts

are better able to sort out fictitious or questionable claims
from those that are real because the civil liability system is
based upon concepts of fault and proximate cause.

The barriers

presented by such concepts naturally have the effect of
preventing the filing, and weeding out, of questionable claims.

In shortf good public policy would dictate that claims for
slander, false imprisonment and the like should best be dealt
with by the civil courts, absent some fact which makes them
uniquely industrial in nature.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court of Appeals
erred in its holding that the slander in this case constituted a
compensable industrial injury or accident.

This Court should

grant the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, reverse the Court of
Appeals and remand the case to the trial court on the merits, on
the issues of slander and intentional and negligent infliction of
emotional distress.

In the alternative, the Court should remand

for trial only that portion of the case which involves damages to
reputation, embarrassment and suffering.

This would allow the

remainder of the claim for the psychological and physical
injuries and permanent and partial impairment to be decided under
the principles of worker's compensation.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of June, 1989.
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311 South State Street, Suite 240
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
k

PERCY MOUNTEER,
Plaintiff,

--COM

* * * -w% - i f

*»

gri.

' -*

9 t

.i'u'.i'i.' S' , : '

v.

UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,

Civil Mo^Tf 7 - J
(Judge

Defendant.

1 Hi «tf^

VI .

77/
/

Plaintiff, for cause of action, complains and alleges
against defendant as follows:
THE PARTIES
1.

Plaintiff is a resident of Emery County, State of

2.

Defendant is a public utility and a corporation

Utah.

licensed to do business in the State of Utah and does business in
Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
3.

Niki Larsen, at all times relevant hereto, was an

employee of the defendant, employed in the Administrative Office
of the defendant as Chief of Security.

At all times relevant

herein, Larsen was acting with actual or apparent authority of
defendant UP&L.
4.

At all relevant times herein, the plaintiff was an

employee of the defendant, Utah Power & Light Company ("UP&L"),

in its Mining Division.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
5.

On or about October 6, 1986, plaintiff was working

as a warehouseman at Des-Be-Dove Minef in Emery County.
6.

On October 6, 1986, the plaintiff was in a

substantial, elevated state of stress, caused by the defendant,
for the following reasons:
(a)

In December, 19 84, at the time of the

well-known Wilburg Mine accident, plaintiff was a dispatcher at
the Wilburg Mine.
(b)

Plaintiff was called by a belt boss in the

"fifth right" area and told that there was a fire in the mine,
and the plaintiff should shut off the power.
(c)

The plaintiff proceeded to shut down the

power to the entire mine, having understood that as the directive
of the belt boss.
(d) As a result of the shutting off of power in
the mine, those charged with the responsibility of fighting the
fire were not able to get power to run the hoses and to pump the
poisonous air out of the mine.
(e)

Plaintiff attempted to consult with various

management personnel at UP&L about the problem because he felt a
sense of guilt since he was the individual who had the power
turned off to the mine.

In addition, several months after the

disaster, plaintiff was transferred to the guardhouse at the
front gate of the mine.

In this position, he was required to

interface with widows and family members of the deceased miners.
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(f)

Because of the great strain caused by these

activities, he sought advice and help from various personnel
employed by a subsidiary of the defendant, Emery Mining Company.
(g)

On one occasion, he was told by Gene Shockey,

President of Emery Mining Company, to tell the grieving families
essentially to "get lost" because nothing was owed by the company
to these people.
(h) Plaintiff was forced to live with this
pressure until it caused significant problems in his personal
life.
7.

While the plaintiff was in this agitated state,

defendant's agent, Niki Larsen, came to the Des-Be-Dove Mine on
October 6, 1986, and, in violation of company policy, and on an
open-page system that was connected to loudspeakers, knowingly
communicated to many of defendant's other employees the
allegation that defendant was on drugs. When advised by another
of defendant's employees that it was being broadcast on the
public-address system, Larsen persisted and continued to make
allegations to the effect that plaintiff was on drugs.
8.

The allegations were totally false.

9.

Defendant's agent, Niki Larsen, had been

instructed by her superiors in the defendant's organization to
investigate the plaintiff for drug use.

UP&L had specific

procedures that were to be followed when someone was suspected of
drug use.
10.

Plaintiff sustained severe damage from the false

allegations in that it caused him severe mental and emotional

damage, to the extent that he had to check into a psychiatric
hospital for treatment.
11.

Plaintiff has sustained, as a rsjsult of the

actions of the defendant, a severe aggravation of post-traumatic
stress disorder, such that he is permanently and totally disabled
from employment.
12.

Plaintiff has incurred substantial medical costs

and is expected to incur substantial medical expenses in the
future.
13.

At the time of defendant's actions in this case,

plaintiff was making approximately $32,000.00 per year.

Since

the defendant's actions, he has been incapable of working and is
not expected to work in the future.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
- Slander 14.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference the

allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 13 above.
15.

The statement made by the defendant's agent was

false and defamatory in that it alleged that plaintiff was on
drugs when such was not the case.
16.

The publication of the defamatory statement by

Larsen was not privileged and, in fact, was in violation of the
company's procedures with respect to allegations of drug use in
any event.
17.

The actions of the defendant, by and through its

agent, were intentional or at least grossly negligent.
18.

Plaintiff sustained extensive damages to his

psychological, mental and emotional wellbeingf including but not
limited to, post-traumatic stress disorder, anguish and
depression.

In addition, the plaintiff has been permanently

damaged in his occupation such that he is permanently and totally
disabled.

He has also sustained extensive medical costs and will

have substantial future costs.
19.

Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages because

of the intentional, malicious and outrageous nature of the
conduct involved.
SECOND CADSE OF ACTION
- Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 20.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference the

allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 13 above.
21.

The actions of the defendant, by and through its

agentf constituted extreme and outrageous conduct which
intentionally or recklessly caused severe emotional distress to
the plaintiff.
22.

Defendant is liable for the damages set forth in

paragraphs 9 through 13, 18 and 19 above.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
- Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 23.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference the

allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 13 above.
24.

In the alternative, and in the event that the

actions of the defendant herein were neither intentional nor
reckless, then the defendants actions were negligent.
25.

Defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous,

and caused severe emotional distress to the plaintiff.
26.

Defendant is liable for the damages set forth in

paragraphs 9 through 13, 18 and 19 above.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgment against defendant
as follows:
1.

For judgment for slander, in the amount of

$500,000, or such other sum as may be proved, for permanent total
disability due to post-traumatic stress disorder.
2.

For $300,000, or such other sum as may be proved

at trial, for general damages for embarrassment, suffering,
damage to reputation, and other such damages as may be proved at
trial.
3.

For medical expenses in such an amount as

plaintiff has incurred, and for an amount that he will incur in
the future.
4.

In the event that any defense is raised in bad

faith and without merit, for an award of attorney's fees.
5.

For costs of court herein.

6.

For such other relief as the Court may deem just

in the premises.
DATED this 5th day of June, 1987.
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BYKES

//•

Attorney for Plaifotiff
Plaintiff's Address;
96 East 200 North
Huntington, UT 84528
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRI
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY

PERCY MOUNTEER,

CIVIL NO.

Plaintiff,

C-87-3791

vs.
UTAH POWER & LIGHT CO.,
Defendant.

The

defendant's

prejudice.

Motion

to

Dismiss

is

granted

without

The Court finds as grounds, among others, for the

granting of summary judgment herein that Utah Power & Light is
not vicariously liable for the acts of its employee herein; that
said acts of said employee were in violation of policy of the
employer; that Utah Power & Light is not liable for defamatory
statements made by one of its employees against another, unless
the employee was directed to make said statements, which she was
not in this case; and that Utah law does not recognize a cause of
action

for

negligent

infliction

of

emotional

distress.

Defendant's attorneys will draft the Order.

Dated t h i s

/
'^

V
day of^Augjjsttf

M
ISW/J

ATTEST
H- DIXON HINDLEY
ts -CLERK
u
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PAGE TWO

MINUTE ENTRY

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Minute Entry, postage prepaid, to the following,
this

/€>

day of August, 1987:

Robert B. Sykes
Attorney for Plaintiff
311 S. State, Suite 240
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Robert Gordon
Paul H. Proctor
Attorneys for Defendant
1407 W. North Temple, Suite 340
P.O. Box 899

S a l t Lake City, Utah

84110

AATTTl^L

» n - i - u im \jL.cnr\o

urriot

Salt Lake County Utah

SEP 2-2-1987
H. Dixon Hindtey, C^rk^yOist.

Br

ROBERT GORDON, #1221
PAUL H. PROCTOR, #2657
Attorneys for
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
1407 West North Temple, Suite 340
P. 0. Box 899
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 535-4256

Court

K rflpTO?rw^
f\ Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PERCY MOUNTEER,

]

Plaintiff,

]>

ORDER AND JUDGiMENT
OF DISMISSAL

v.
Civil No. 87-3791
UTAH POWER & LIGHT CO.,
Hon. Richard H. Moffat
Defendant.
By Motion dated July 22,

1987, Utah Power & Light Company

moved the Court to dismiss the plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to
Rule 12, U.R.C.P., which Motion was supported by a Memoranda of
Authorities.

Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a Memorandum of

Points and Authorities

in Opposition.

The Motion was orally

argued before the Court on July 31, 1987, at which time it was.
taken under advisement.

On August 3, 1987, the plaintiff filed a

Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition and in addition, filed a
Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint together with the
proposed Amended Complaint.
On August 17, 1987, having fully considered all pleadings
filed by the parties and the oral argument, the Court issued its

APPENDIX - J L

Minute Entryf

a true and correct copy of which

is attached

hereto.
NOW THEREFOREf

in accordance with the Minute Entry, the

Court enters the following findings and grounds for the judgment:
1.

Utah Power & Light Company is not vicariously liable

for the acts alleged herein of its employee Nickie Larsen.
2.

The acts of Nickie Larsen in knowingly communicating on

an open-page system connected to loudspeakers to many of Utah
Power & Light Company's other employees the allegation that the
plaintiff was on drugs was in violation of the policy of Nickie
Larsen's employer, Utah Power & Light Company.
3.

Utah Power & Light Company is not liable for defamatory

statements made by its employee against the plaintiff, a coemployee, unless Utah Power & Light Company directed the employee
to make the defamatory statements.
4.

Utah Power & Light Company did not direct its employee

Nickie Larsen to make the defamatory statements.
5.

Utah law does not recognize a cause of action for

negligent infliction of emotional distress.
THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
this action should be and is hereby dismissed without prejudice.
DATED this

3-#2^day of September 1987.
BY THE^CPURT:

ird/ WMof f a t
D i s t r i c t {lourt Judge
ATTEST
H. DIXON HINDL6Y
CLERK

Approved as to form:

Robert B. Sy&feS, Esq.
M. Gale Lenuntm, Esq.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
10.0002.2
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107 Utah A
general
principles
of
statutory
construction,
when injuries are suffered that have been
caused by an unknown act of negligence by an the more specific statute, section 78-14expert, the law ought not to be construed to 4(l)(b), controls.
Applying section 78-14-4(l)(b) to the
destroy a right of action before a person even
becomes aware of the existence of that right. Id. facts in this case, we must again examine when
Floyd discovered or should have discovered
at 147.
In this case, unlike Foil, Floyd's deposition alleged misconduct on the part of the health
testimony establishes that Floyd was aware in care provider. As has previously been stated,
September of 1982 that Dr. Lindem performed Floyd's deposition indicates that he discovered
surgery in addition to the hiatal hernia surgery or should have discovered the alleged miscoand that his symptoms were caused #by the nduct by September 1982, but his notice of
additional surgery. In contrast to Fo/i, Floyd intent to bring this action was not filed until
had made the connection between the surgery November 1985. Therefore, we hold that his
and his symptoms, according to his clear claim was barred by the one year statute of
deposition testimony. Therefore, by September limitations set forth in section 78-141982, at the latest, Floyd discovered or should 4(l)(b). Accordingly, we find no error in the
have discovered the injury and that the addi- trial court's grant of summary judgment for
tional surgical procedures caused his injury. defendants.
Finally, Floyd asserts that the special statute
Consequently, we find no error in the trial
court's grant of summary judgment for def- of limitations contained in the Utah Health
Care Malpractice Act violates the equal protendants.
Floyd also asserts that the trial court erred ection clause of the United States and Utah
in granting summary judgment because a Constitutions. However, Floyd failed to raise
question of fact exists regarding whether the this issue in the trial court proceedings or
health care providers attempted to conceal preserve it on the record, and we decline to
facts from Floyd and prevent him from disc- consider the issue for the first time on appeal.
overing the injury and the alleged negligence James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987).
which caused the injury.
Utah Code Ann. §78-14-4(l)(b) (1987)
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
provides:
WE CONCUR:
In an action where it is alleged that
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
a patient has been prevented from
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
discovering misconduct on the part
of the health care provider because
the health care provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently
Cite as
conceal the alleged misconduct, the
107 Utah Adv. Rep. 71
claim shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the
IN THE
plaintiff or patient discovers, or
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
through the use of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the
Percy MOUNTEER,
fraudulent concealment, whichever
Plaintiff and Appellant,
occurs first.
v.
Floyd claims that a conflict exists between UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,
the above statute and Utah Code Ann. §78Defendant and Respondent.
12-26(3) (1987), which provides for a three
year statute of limitations in causes of action No. 880189-CA
for fraud and mistake. Under general rules of FILED: May 2,1989
statutory construction, where two statutes
treat the same subject matter, and one statute Third District, Salt Lake County
is general while the other is specific, the spe- Honorable Richard H. Moffat
cific provision controls. State v. Burnham, 87
Utah 445, 49 P.2d 963, 965 (1935); see also ATTORNEYS:
State v. Hamblin, 676 P.2d 376, 378 (Utah Robert B. Sykes, M. Gale Lemmon, Salt Lake
City, for'Appellant
1983); Cannon v. Gardner, 611 P.2d 1207,
1209 (Utah 1980). In this case, section 78-12- Robert Gordon, Paul H. Proctor, Salt Lake
26(3) contains the general statute of limitations
City, for Respondent
for fraud while section 78-14-4(l)(b) of the
Before Judges Bench, Garff, and Jackson.
Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act specifically
provides the statute of limitations for cases
MEMORANDUM DECISION
involving patients who have been prevented
from discovering misconduct on the part of
the health care provider. In accordance with

Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Company
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JACKSON, Judge:
Percy Mounteer appeals from the final
order and judgment dismissing his complaint
for failure to state a cause of action against
respondent Utah Power & Light Company
("UP&L"). We affirm.
According to the June 1987 complaint filed
in this action, Mounteer worked as a warehouseman at UP&L's mine in Emery County,
Utah. He was under elevated mental stress
because of his involvement in the December
1984 Wilburg mine disaster. Niki Larsen, a
security guard for UP&L, was instructed by
her superiors at UP&L to investigate Mounteer
for suspected drug use. UP&L had specific
procedures to be followed in such cases. On
October 6, 1986, Larsen came to the mine,
briefly interviewed Mounteer at work, and
in violation of company policy, and
on an open-page system that was
connected to loudspeakers, knowingly communicated to many of
defendant's other employees that
[Mounteer] was on drugs. When
advised by another of defendant's
employees that it was being broadcast on the public-address system,
Larsen persisted and continued to
make allegations to the effect that
plaintiff was on drugs.
These false statements, which Mounteer
claimed were either intentionally, recklessly, or
negligently made by Larsen, resulted in severe
mental and emotional damage that, in turn,
resulted in Mounteer's hospitalization and the
aggravation of his post-traumatic stress disorder, rendering him totally disabled from
employment.
Mounteer did not sue Larsen, and made no
allegations of any negligent or intentional
injurious acts by UP&L directly. Instead, he
sought to hold UP&L vicariously liable in
damages for the acts of its agent, Larsen,
under three asserted causes of action. The first
was for slander for the unprivileged publication of false and defamatory statements,
which, "in fact, was in violation of the
company's procedures with respect to allegations of drug use ...." The second and third
causes of action were for intentional and
negligent infliction of emotional distress. He
requested reimbursement for medical expenses,
and damages for permanent total disability,
suffering, and damage to reputation.
In the absence of any allegations that UP&L
intended or directed Larsen's injurious acts,
which were allegedly in violation of UP&L's
policy, the trial court concluded UP&L could
not be liable. Mounteer's complaint was dismissed without prejudice.1
T« ../^j&virins* o HJcmiccol fnr failure tn *tate a
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in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
indulge all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's
favor. Arrow Indus, v. Zions First Natl
Bank, 767 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988). Such a
dismissal is appropriate only where it appears
to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be
entitled to relief under any state of facts which
could be proved in support of the claims asserted. Freegard v. First W. Natl Bank, 738
P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1987).
Appellant avers that his is a textbook case
in which the employer should be vicariously
liable, under the principle of respondeat superior, for the negligent or intentional acts of
an employee/agent that injure a third party
while that employee is carrying out the employer's business and acting within the scope of
employment. See, e.g., Birkner v. Salt Lake
County, 104 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (1989); Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 101
Utah Adv. Rep. 24 (1989); see also Johnson v.
Rogers, 763 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988) (recognizing
cause of action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress and enunciating standards
for employer's vicarious liability to third party
for punitive damages awarded against negligent employee).
We agree that, viewing Mounteer's allegations in a favorable light, as we must, reasonable minds could conclude as a factual
matter that Larsen was acting within the scope
of her employment under the criteria enunciated in Birkner, 104 Utah Adv. Rep. at 1920, when she made the allegedly defamatory
statements. However, the appropriate legal
analysis does not stop here. Mounteer ignores
the additional key fact that he was Larsen's
fellow employee when he was allegedly injured
in the course of his employment by Larsen's
performance of her assigned task and refuses
to acknowledge that the workers' compensation statute has reshaped an employer's liability in such circumstances. See Masich v.
United States Smelting, Refining & Mining
Co., 113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d 612, 615-17, appeal
dismissed, 335 U.S. 866 (1948); see
generally 1 A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law §§4.10-4.50 (1985).
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-60 (1988) provides:
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the provisions of
this title for injuries sustained by an
employee, whether resulting in
death or not, shall be the exclusive
remedy against the employer and
shall be the exclusive remedy
against any officer, agent, or employee of the employer and the liabilities of the employer imposed by
this act shall be in place of any and
all other civil liability whatsoever,
«•
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intentional injury as an exception to the
general exclusiveness rule; it must allege facts
that add up to a deliberate intent [by the
employer] to bring about injury." 2A A.
Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law
§68.14 (1987). In the absence of any such
factual allegations, however, the trial court
correctly concluded as a matter of law that
Mounteer failed to state a claim against
UP&L.
The order of the trial court dismissing
Mounteer's complaint is, therefore, affirmed.
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Russell W. Bench, Judge
Regnal W. Garff, Judge

107 Utah Adv. Rep. 71

person whomsoever, on account of
any accident or injury or death, in
any way contracted, sustained,
aggravated or incurred by such
employee in the course of or
because of or arising out of his
employment, and no action at law
may be maintained against an
employer or against any officer,
agent, or employee of the employer
based upon any accident, injury or
death of an employee....
(Emphasis added.) If an employee suffers a
compensable injury, defined in Utah Code
Ann. §35-1-45 (1987) as one that occurs
by accident arising out of or in the course of
his employment,2 this section bars the maintenance of an action at law against either a
fellow employee who is merely negligent or the
employer as a vicariously liable principal.
Instead, workers' compensation provides the
exclusive remedy to the injured employee. E.g.,
Morrill v. J & M Constr. Co., 635 P.2d
88 (Utah 1981); Gallegos v. Stringham, 21
Utah 2d 139, 442 P.2d 31 (1968); Masich, 191
P.2dat616.
On the other hand, an employee who, in the
course and scope of his or her employment,
intentionally acts to injure a co-worker is not
protected by this exclusivity provision from a
separate action at law for damages. Bryan v.
Utah Int'l, 533 P.2d 892 (Utah 1975). But, in
such a case, the employer is liable only to the
extent of workers' compensation benefits
unless the injurious act was directed or intended by the employer. Id. at 895. Without
such direct responsibility, the employer "could
not be required to respond as the offending
employee's superior." Stewart v. CMI Corp.,
740 P.2d 134Q, 1341 n.l (Utah 1987) (dictum).
See A. Larson, 2A Workmen's Compensation
Law §§68.21, 68.23 & n.37, 68.33 & n.49.f
(1987).
According to Mounteer's own allegations,
he was indisputably injured by accident3
arising out of or in the course of his employment. He was thus clearly^ barred by the
statute from bringing a negligence action at
law against either Larsen or UP&L. His allegations concerning Larsen's intentional
conduct, however, were sufficient to state a
direct tort claim against her that was not
barred by the exclusivity provision in section
35-1-60, but she was not made a defendant,
and UP&L cannot be liable at law for
Larsen's intentional acts merely by operation
of vicarious liability.4 If Mounteer had alleged
facts supporting an inference that UP&L directed or intended Larsen's injurious acts, he
would have sufficiently stated a claim against
UP&L directly, and the statute would likewise
afford UP&L no shield from liability in
damages. "A complaint, to survive a motion
to dismiss, must do more than merely allege

1. Because this ruling resolved the legal merits of
any cause Mounteer may frame against UP&L, the
order dismissing his complaint without prejudice is
final for purposes of appeal. See Bowles v. State ex
re/. Utah Dep't of Transp., 652 P.2d 1345 (Utah
1982).
2. This phrase was recently changed to "by accident
arising out of and in the course of employment."
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-45 (1988) (emphasis
added).
3. Mounteer summariiy contends that his injuries
are not compensable as resulting from an "accident"
under section 35-1-45 (1987) because they did not
arise from any "physical contact, strain, exertion or
other physical cause" but from mental anguish and
an exacerbated nervous condition resulting from
Larsen's actions. However, as the Utah Supreme
Court held in Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d
15, 22 (Utah 1986), an "accident" for purposes of
workers' compensation "is an unexpected or unintended occurrence that may be either the cause or the
result* of the injury." Whether Mounteer's injury
arose from a physical or mental cause is, therefore,
irrelevant to the issue of whether it occurred "by
accident" within the meaning of the statute.
4. Commenting on Thompson v. Maimonides
Medical Center, 86 A.D.2d 867, 447 N.Y.S.2d 308
(1982), in which an employee's causes of action
imputing liability to the employer for a coemployee's defamation, negligence, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress were dismissed for
this same reason, Professor Larson notes: "This is
true even if some of the harms resulting are of a
kind for which compensation affords no remedy,
such as loss of reputation, humiliation and embarrassment. The psychological injuries such as depression or psychotic reactions would, of course, still
be compensable under the compensation act." 2A A.
Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law §68.23
n.37 (1987).
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NOTES TO DECISIONS

Notice and opportunity to be heard.
This section inferentially at least provides
that the commission shall give notice and an
opportunity to be heard to all persons whose
rights may be affected by its award. Therefore,

commission, whose award has been annulled,
cannot amend its findings of facts without giving employer notice and an opportunity to be
heard. Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 74 Utah 316, 279 P. 612 (1929).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 100 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 638.

Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation
** 1765.

35-1-60. Exclusive remedy against employer, or officer,
agent or employee — Occupational disease excepted.
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the provisions of this title for
injuries sustained by an employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be
the exclusive remedy against the employer and shall be the exclusive remedy
against any officer, agent or employee of the employer and the liabilities of
the employer imposed by this act shall be in place of any and all other civil
liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to such employee or to his
spouse, widow, children, parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, personal representatives, guardian, or any other person whomsoever, on account of any
accident or injury or death, in any way contracted, sustained, aggravated or
incurred by such employee in the course of or because of or arising out of his
employment, and no action at law may be maintained against an employer or
against any officer, agent or employee of the employer based upon any accident, injury or death of an employee. Nothing in this section, however, shall
prevent an employee (or his dependents) from filing a claim with the industrial commission of Utah for compensation in those cases within the provisions of the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Act, as amended.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 76; C.L. 1917,
§ 3132; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 42-1-57; L. 1949, ch. 52, § 1.
Cross-References. — Employment of children, § 34-23-1 et seq.

Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law,
§ 35-2-1 et seq.
Meaning of "this act". — See the note under the same catchline following § 35-1-46.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Compulsory.
Effect of no-fault insurance.
Employer.
Exclusiveness of remedy.
—Minor engaged in hazardous employment.
Farmers and domestics.
Hospital charges.
Indemnification agreement between employer and third party.
Indemnity agreement.
Intentional tort.
Joint venture.
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Liability to third parties.
Nature and adequacy of act.
Negligent injury by employee of same employer.
Occupational disease.
Statutory employer.
—"Sufficient control."
Subcontractor's employee.
Tort liability of employer.
—"Dual capacity" doctrine.
Cited.
Compulsory.
Utah Workmen's Compensation Act is compulsory and not elective. Lovato v. Beatrice
Foods, 22 Utah 2d 371, 453 P.2d 692 (1969).
Effect of no-fault insurance.
The No-Fault Insurance Act, former
§ 31-41-1 et seq., did not supersede or nullify
the Workmen's Compensation Act's exclusive
remedy provision as applied to injuries from
motor vehicle accidents suffered in the course
of employment. IML Freight, Inc. v. Ottosen,
538 P.2d 296 (Utah 1975).
Employer.
Worker was employee of cable television
company, its subsidiary, and its limited partner for purposes of the exclusive remedy provisions of the Utah Workmen's Compensation
Act where the cable television company, as
part of its management style, grouped all employees together under its direct control and
where the worker's time sheets and checks
were managed by the cable television company. Freund v. (Jtah Power & Light, 625 F.
Supp. 272 (D. Utah 1985).
Exclusiveness of remedy.
Under this section when the injury is caused
by the negligent act of the employer, no willful
misconduct being claimed, the injured employee or, when the injury causes death, his
dependents, must be content to accept the compensation provided by the act. Hailing v. Industrial Comm'n, 71 Utah 112, 263 P. 78
(1927).
Since the enactment of the Workmen's Compensation Act in 1917, the exclusive remedy of
an employee who is injured in the course of his
employment is the right to recover the compensation provided for in the act (§ 35-1-1 et seq.).
Murray v. Wasatch Grading Co., 73 Utah 430,
274 P. 940 (1929); Ortega v. Salt Lake Wet
Wash Laundry, 108 Utah 1, 156 P.2d 885
(1945).
Employee of railroad was not precluded from
filing claim for compensation by application
filed under Federal Employers' Liability Act
on ground of election since employee did not
have two remedies but only one; if injury was
incurred while he was engaged in interstate
commerce, his remedy was under Federal Employers' Liability Act and if not, it was under

state act. Utah Idaho Cent. R.R. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 84 Utah 364, 35 P.2d 842, 94 A.L.R.
1423 (1934).
This section abrogates employee's commonlaw right to sue employer for injuries suffered
while in course of employment, except where
employer is not subject to this act or commonlaw remedy of employee is expressly reserved.
Masich v. United States Smelting, Ref. & Mining Co., 113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d 612, appeal
dismissed, 335 U.S. 866, 69 S. Ct. 138, 93 L.
Ed. 411 (1948).
This section makes it clear that this chapter
is the exclusive vehicle for recovery of compensation for injury or death, against the employer
and other employees to the exclusion of any
and all other civil liability whatsover, at common law or otherwise, and that it bars all next
of kin or dependents, or anyone else, from
using any other means of recovery against employers and others named in and covered by
the Act, than the Act itself. Morrill v. J & M
Constr. Co., 635 P.2d 88 (Utah 1981).
— Minor engaged in hazardous employment.
Even if a minor employee is injured while
engaged in hazardous employment in violation
of § 34-23-2, prohibiting the employment of
minors in hazardous occupations, the minor's
exclusive remedy is through this chapter, and
the minor cannot void her employment contract and sue in tort. Bingham v. Lagoon Corp.,
707 P.2d 678 (Utah 1985).
Farmers and domestics.
Farm laborers and domestic servants, in the
event of an accident or injury, are entitled to
pursue their common-law remedies in an action against the employer because they are excepted from the act by §§ 35-1-42 and 35-1-43.
Murray v. Strike, 76 Utah 118, 287 P. 922
(1930).
Hospital charges.
The only power given the Industrial Commission by the workers' compensation statutes
over hospital charges for services rendered to
injured employees is the right to refuse to pay
that part of them which is excessive in amount
or for care which was not reasonably necessary; Industrial Commission does not have the
power and authority to set maximum rates
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which hospitals may charge for services rendered injured employees, and hospitals are not
prohibited from holding an injured employee
liable for any amounts not paid by the commission. Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 657 P.2d 1289 (Utah 1982).
Indemnification agreement between employer and third party.
Where employer and third party voluntarily
enter into a written indemnification agreement whereby the employer agrees to indemnify the third party against claims arising out
of injuries to the employer's employees, and
where an employee is injured and is compensated by the employer in accordance with the
workers' compensation law, the exclusive remedy provision of this section does not preclude
the enforcement of the indemnification agreement by the third party against the employer
for amounts paid by the third party to the employee as a result of the injury. Shell Oil Co. v.
Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co., 658 R2d 1187
(Utah 1983).
Indemnity agreement
An indemnity agreement is a separate undertaking by the employer that will be enforceable despite workers' compensation if the indemnity provision expressly covers the indemnitor's employees, but the phrase "person or
persons" does not cover indemnitor's own employees given the dramatic consequences of
such an interpretation. Wollam v. Kennecott
Corp., 663 F. Supp. 268 (D. Utah 1987).
Intentional tort.
Provision prohibiting action for damages
against fellow employee does not prohibit
maintenance of action for premeditated and intentional act of fellow employee. Bryan v. Utah
Infl, 533 P.2d 892 (Utah 1975).
Joint venture.
Construction company obtained contract to
construct diversion tunnel at dam and entered
into agreement with corporation by which the
two organizations would unite their efforts to
complete such construction and share in profits
or losses from the enterprise. Miner, hired by
the construction company, who was injured
while working on the tunnel and who obtained
workmen's compensation benefits, could not
sue corporation for alleged negligence of corporate employees since the two companies were
regarded as the employing unit. The employees
of both companies were engaged in the same
employment. Cook v. Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 15
Utah 2d 20, 386 P.2d 616 (1963).
This section barred suit by workmen against
joint venturer which was his employer for injuries sustained in use of machine furnished by a
second joint venturer, where machine was furnished pursuant to contract creating the joint

venture. Hammer v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 29
Utah 2d 415, 510 P.2d 1104 (1973).
Liability to third parties.
Where plaintiff employee was injured when
a fellow employee drove the truck in which
they were riding into the side of a train, and
brought an action against the railroad and the
manufacturer of the crossing signal, alleging
negligent upkeep and product defect, respectively, neither defendant could join plaintiff's
employer as a third-party defendant in order to
assert a claim for contribution from it under
the joint tort-feasor statute. Curtis v. Harmon
Elec, Inc., 552 P.2d 117 (Utah 1976); Phillips
v. Union Pac. R.R., 614 P.2d 153 (Utah 1980)
(decided under prior law).
Nature and adequacy of act
The workers' compensation scheme is purely
statutory, and the act (§ 35-1-1 et seq.) provides a plain, speedy, and adequate method of
review. Woldberg v. Industrial Comm'n, 74
Utah 309, 279 P. 609 (1929).
Negligent injury by employee of same employer.
Where subcontractor was an "employee" of
contractor, other employee of contractor could
not maintain negligence action against subcontractor but must look to workers' compensation
insurance. Gallegos v. Stringham, 21 Utah 2d
139, 442 P.2d 31 (1968).
Occupational disease.
Administratrix of deceased city employee,
who died from inhalation of paint he was ordered to spray on trucks, could bring an action
at law against the employer, since such was
not an accidental injury compensable under
this act (§ 35-1-1 et seq.), but was an "occupational disease." Young v. Salt Lake City, 97
Utah 123, 90 P.2d 174 (1939).
Statutory employer.
—"Sufficient control."
Where joint owners of interests in oil and gas
leases provided for construction of a gas processing plant located in Utah, to be operated as
a "mutually profitable venture" for the purpose
of extracting liquid hydrocarbons, and under
the operating agreement the owners reserved
the power of ultimate control over the project
and over the operator thereof, the owners retained "sufficient control" to qualify as statutory employers of an employee of the operator
pursuant to § 35-1-42(2) and the exclusive
remedy provision of this section applied. Lamb
v. W-Energy, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 395 (D. Utah
1987).
Subcontractor's employee.
Subcontractor's employee could not recover
from general contractor in civil action for injuries on theory that subcontractor was his em-
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ployer and general contractor was a third person not in the same employment. Smith v. Alfred Brown Co., 27 Utah 2d 155, 493 P.2d 994
(1972).
This section does not forbid or render invalid
a clause in a construction subcontract by which
the subcontractor agreed to indemnify the
prime contractor and save him harmless for all
liability arising out of the injury or death of an
employee of subcontractor, where such clause
existed and decedent workman's administratrix sued prime contractor for wrongful death
of decedent and recovered; therefore, decedent's employer is required to reimburse prime
contractor covered by workmen's compensation
as provided in such indemnity clause. Titan
Steel Corp. v. Walton, 365 F.2d 542 (10th Cir.
1966).
Tort liability of employer.
— "Dual capacity" doctrine.
Utah law does not recognize as an exception
to the exclusive remedy provisions of the
Worker's Compensation Act, the so-called
"dual capacity" doctrine under which an employer, shielded from tort liability by the act,
may become liable in tort if he occupies, in addition to his capacity as employer, a second ca-
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pacity that confers on him an obligation independent of those imposed on him as an employer. Worthen v. Kennecott Corp., 780 F.2d
856 (10th Cir. 1985).
An employee cannot hold his employer liable
in tort for injuries resulting from the employer's maintenance of unsafe premises, on
the reasoning that the employer occupies a separate capacity and owes separate duties to his
employees as an owner of the premises, since
the employer's duty to maintain a safe workplace is inseparable from the employer's general duties as an employer toward his employees. Bingham v. Lagoon Corp., 707 P.2d
678 (Utah 1985).
The dual capacity doctrine did not apply to a
products liability claim brought on behalf of a
decedent who was killed when he was pulled
into a large screw-auger manufactured by defendant while decedent was working on his employer's premises, where the employer had not
assumed a separate and distinct obligation toward his employee other than as employer.
Stewart v. CMI Corp., 740 P.2d 1340 (Utah
1987).
Cited in Smith v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 814
F 2d 1481 (10th Cir. 1987).
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35-1-61. Repealed.
Repeals. — Section 35-1-61 (C. 1943, Supp.,
42-1-57-10, enacted by L. 1945, ch. 65, § 2),
relating to injuries to or death of illegally em-

ployed minor, was repealed by Laws 1971, ch.
76, § 11.

193

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered four
true and correct copies of the foregoing Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah to the attorneys at the
addresses listed listed below, on the 1st day of June, 1989.
Robert Gordon, Esq.
Paul H. Proctor, Esq.
Attorneys for Respondent
1407 West North Temple, #340
P. 0. Box 899
Salt Lake City, UT 84110

ROBERT B. SYKES
Attorney for Appellant
835/WC

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered four
true and correct copies of the foregoing Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah to the attorneys at the
addresses listed listed below, on the 1st day of June, 1989.
Robert Gordon, Esq.
Paul H. Proctor, Esq.
Attorneys for Respondent
1407 West North Temple, #340
P. 0. Box 899
Salt Lake City, UT 84110

RpteERT^g. SYKES
Attorney for Appellant
835/WC

